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The Bill of Rights Debate
The first two articles in this series discussed certain features of the English
legal profession and the English rules governing discovery and the recovery
of counsel fees. It was suggested that English practice in these areas could
serve as a model for reforms in American legal education and litigation pro-
cedures. This final installment will examine the current British debate regard-
ing proposals for enactment of a Bill of Rights and will discuss the historical
background of that debate as well as the relevance of the American constitu-
tional experience.I
The Bill of Rights proponents in Britain have called for the adoption of a
constitutional instrument which would protect fundamental individual liber-
ties against the exercise of legislative and executive power. They challenge the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty which now prevails in Britain because
that doctrine, in contrast to the American concept of guaranteed liberties and
limited government, declares that Parliament's legislative power is supreme
and unlimited by any constitutional or judicial restraint. A simple majority
of Parliament could abolish even the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights of
1689 if it chose to do so, because these instruments have no higher standing
than ordinary Acts of Parliament. And while British judges have the duty of
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interpreting Acts of Parliament, they are absolutely bound to follow the
terms of such statutes so long as the statutes are "sufficiently explicit, un-
equivocal and comprehensive." 2 Thus, there is no institutional limitation on
Parliament's authority, and, as discussed below, Parliament is free to enact
legislation which would impair even the individual rights recognized at com-
mon law. The Bill of Rights advocates contend that Parliament's unlimited
power poses a grave threat to personal liberties, and they therefore seek a
constitutional protection of those liberties and a corresponding limitation on
parliamentary power.
While the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty prevails in Britain today,
it did not become established until the beginning of the eighteenth century,
after it had supplanted two other legal theories which could have supported
the concept of a written constitution with guaranteed personal rights. The
first of these rival theories was the "natural law" doctrine. The medieval,
scholastic formulation of the natural law theory, which was still influential in
1600, stated that the laws of the state were subject to and must accord with the
fundamental, divine order decreed by God and revealed to man through
Nature and human reason. Although English common-law judges and law-
yers in the early seventeenth century did not entirely agree with the scholastic
conception of natural law, many of them did assert that the common law was
"fundamental" and should prevail over statutory law because it was based
upon generations of human reasoning and experience. For example, in Dr.
Bonham's Case3 in 1610, Lord Coke refused to enforce an Act of Parliament
which he believed to violate the common-law rule that "no man shall be judge
in his own case." Coke declared:
[1It appears in our books that in many cases, the common law will controul Acts
of Parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; for when an Act of
Parliament is against the common right and reason or repugnant or impossible to be
performed the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.'
However, Coke's idea that the common law (including the common-law
rights of the subject) was "fundamental" in a constitutional sense and could
override statutory law5 did not long survive his dismissal from the King's
Bench in 1616. By 1640, Parliament, rather than the judiciary, was recog-
nized as the chief defense against royal absolutism.6 And after the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, Parliament established its own supremacy at the expense
of the courts. Thus, as described by Lord Reid in British Railways Board v.
Pickin, 7 the idea that the judiciary could uphold" fundamental" legal princi-
ples and rights against the will of Parliament was effectively dead by 1700:
IN. ANDERSON, LIBERTY, LAW AND JUSTICE 9, 35-37 (1978).
'8 Co. Rep. 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610).
'Id. at 118a and 652 respectively.
'For discussions of the natural law theory and its influence upon Coke's doctrine that the
English common law was "fundamental," see N. ANDERSON, supra note 2, at 15-21, 37-38; C.
LOVELL, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 324-35 (1962); A. PASSERIN D'ENTREVES,
NATURAL LAW 37-49, 93-94 (2d rev. ed. 1970).
1C. LOVELL, supra note 5, at 324-25, 334-35.
1[19741 A.C. 765.
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In earlier times many learned lawyers seem to have believed that an Act of Parlia-
ment could be disregarded in so far as it was contrary to the law of God or the law of
nature or natural justice, but since the supremacy of Parliament was finally demon-
strated by the Revolution of 1688 any such idea has become obsolete.'
The second rival theory which succumbed to Parliamentary supremacy
was the idea of popular sovereignty based upon a social contract between the
people and their governors. The chief exponent of this theory was John
Locke, who published his Second Treatise of Government in 1689. Relying
upon a more modern variation of the natural law doctrine, Locke declared
that each social and political community was based upon a consensual "com-
pact" among its members, and that each member retained certain "natural
rights" (including the right to be secure in his "property") when he entered
into the compact. Moreover, Locke argued, all government derived from the
consent, and hence the ultimate sovereignty, of the governed. Although the
community necessarily appointed certain persons to govern, these governors
stood in a fiduciary position toward the community and could be removed if
they abused their trust.'
Thus, according to Locke's theory the people, rather than the executive or
legislature, were sovereign. Indeed, the events of 1688-1689 supported his
theory. The "Convention" of peers and commoners which conferred the
crown upon William and Mary after the flight of James II was not a legal
Parliament because James had destroyed the writs necessary to call a new
Parliament. Therefore, the Convention, with the consent of William and
Mary, passed a "bill" which purported to convert its status into that of a
regular Parliament and thereafter enacted the Bill of Rights in 1689. This
"Parliament" could have justified its actions only under the Lockean theory
that it had acted as the representative of the "sovereign" people and the
guardian of their "natural rights." However, Parliament did not recognize
any sovereignty above its own after 1689. Rather, Parliament established its
own supremacy over the monarchy and the nation with the Act of Settlement
of 1701, by which it determined the royal succession.'"
Thus, neither the doctrine of "fundamental law" nor the idea of popular
sovereignty based upon "natural rights" prevailed in Britain. Instead, Par-
liament succeeded in establishing its complete legislative supremacy. For ex-
ample, while certain personal rights are still recognized at common law (such
as, the presumption of innocence in a criminal case; the right against com-
pelled self-incrimination; the rights of peaceful assembly, freedom of asso-
ciation and privacy; and the right to be heard by an impartial judge before
one is deprived of liberty or property)," these rights do not restrict
'Id. at 782.
'J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 11, §§ 95-99, 123-131, 149-158,221-222, 240-243.
See also A. PASSERIN D'ENTREVES, supra note 5, at 57-62.
'
0C. LOVELL, supra note 5, at 392-96; D. KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN
BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at 269-72 (9th ed. 1969).
"See, e.g., Mann, Britain's Bill of Rights, 94 LAW Q. REV. 512, 514-15 (1978); Ridge v.
Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; Kanda v. Government of the Federation of Malaya, [1962] A.C. 322
(P.C.).
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Parliament's exercise of its powers. Unlike Congress, which cannot abrogate
the personal liberties recognized by the American Constitution, Parliament
can pass statutes which deprive a subject of his common-law rights. Thus, in
the wartime case of Liversidge v. Baldwin,2 the House of Lords upheld a
regulation, issued pursuant to an Act of Parliament, which authorized the
Home Secretary to imprison without a hearing any person whom he reason-
ably believed to be "of hostile associations." Lord Wright's judgment in
Liversidge sets forth perhaps the starkest exposition of the doctrine of par-
liamentary sovereignty:
Parliament is supreme. It can enact extraordinary powers of interfering with
personal liberty. If an Act of Parliament or a statutory regulation ... is alleged to
limit or curtail the liberty of the subject or vest in the executive extraordinary powers
of detaining a subject, the only question is what is the precise extent of the powers
given. The answer to that question is only to be found by scrutinizing the language
of the enactment in the light of the circumstances and the general policy and object
of the measure .... [I] n the constitution of this country there are no guaranteed or
absolute rights. The safeguard of British liberty is in the good sense of the people
and in the system of representative and responsible government which has been
evolved . . ..
However, in recent years the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy has
come under attack by such eminent British legal figures as Lord Scarman, a
Law Lord in the House of Lords, Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, the
Lord Chancellor, and Sir Norman Anderson, formerly Professor and Direc-
tor of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in the University of London. In
their view the "safeguard of British liberty" described by Lord Wright is no
longer sufficient to meet the growing threat to personal liberties which, they
believe, is inherent in Parliament's unchecked exercise of its legislative
powers.
Lord Hailsham contends that parliamentary sovereignty has resulted in an
"elective dictatorship" of the House of Commons, and he argues for a com-
prehensive written constitution which would provide for a Bill of Rights and
a bicameral elected legislature with limited powers. Lord Scarman also advo-
cates a written constitution with a Bill of Rights and, like Lord Hailsham and
Sir Norman Anderson, proposes a "constitutional court" which would have
the power to invalidate Acts of Parliament contrary to the new constitution.
All three men agree that the constitution should protect those personal liber-
ties which are considered "fundamental" (for example, freedom of speech,
association, travel and emigration; freedom of religion and conscience; the
right to habeas corpus, due process and equal protection by the law; and, in
criminal cases, the presumption of innocence, a fair trial and freedom from
compelled self-incrimination). They also agree that the constitution should
'2[19421 A.C. 206.
"Id. at 260-61.
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be "entrenched" so that it could be amended only by an extraordinary ma-
jority of Parliament and a popular referendum."'
Each of these proposals draws heavily upon the American constitutional
model. However, it should be noted that the "American" model derives
many of its philosophical foundations from seventeenth-century English
ideas. The American political concepts which led to the Constitution and Bill
of Rights were based substantially on Locke's ideas concerning popular sov-
ereignty and "natural rights,"'" and the American principle of judicial re-
view (that is, the power of the judiciary to determine whether legislative acts
are contrary to the constitution and therefore invalid) in part traces its roots
back to Coke's belief that statutory law should be consistent with "funda-
mental law."' Thus, while the advocates for a British Bill of Rights rely
heavily upon the example of the American Constitution, in doing so they are
in fact returning to English constitutional theories which were swept aside
during the course of Parliament's rise to ascendancy. 7
Some opponents of a British Bill of Rights, particularly those from the
political Left, claim that such a Bill would be an antidemocratic measure
which would restrict the exercise of power by Parliament to meet social
needs. Others oppose the idea of judicial review on the ground that British
judges are too conservative and would not adequately protect personal liber-
ties against encroachments by the State. Certain legal scholars argue that a
Bill of Rights is a constitutional impossibility because Parliament lacks the
authority to restrict its present sovereignty and thereby bind its successors. I
Of these arguments, the last is most significant and raises serious constitu-
tional questions. Because the Bill of Rights proponents appreciate the diffi-
culty of adopting such a Bill as a constitutional measure, they have sought, as
a preliminary step, to pass an ordinary Act of Parliament which would incor-
porate the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms into British law. Although Britain ratified the Con-
vention in 1951, it has never been formally incorporated into British law and
cannot be enforced by British courts.' 9 Therefore, in 1978 a bill to incor-
"L. SCARMAN, ENGLISH LAW: THE NEW DIMENSION (1974); Scarman, Fundamental Rights:
The British Scene, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1575 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Scarman, Fundamental
Rights: The British Scene]; L. HAILSHAM, THE DILEMMA OF DEMOCRACY (1978); Hailsham, Elec-
tive Dictatorship (The Richard Dimbleby Lecture, B.B.C.) (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hail-
sham, Elective Dictatorship]; N. ANDERSON, supra note 2, at 13-14, 38, 44-58. See also M.
ZANDER, A BILL OF RIGHTS? (1975).
"See E.S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-1789, at 74-75, 88-89 (1956); A. PAS-
SERIN D'ENTREVES, supra note 5, at 51-52, 57-63; G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 283 (1969).
'"See, e.g., R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 23-28 (1969).
"See, e.g., N. ANDERSON, supra note 2, at 37-38.
"sFor a summary of the arguments against a British Bill of Rights, see M. ZANDER, supra note
14, at 26-52.
"While the European Convention has not been incorporated into British law, it can be en-
forced against Britain by the European Court of Justice and the European Commission by virtue
of Parliament's passage of the European Communities Act of 1972. Scarman, Fundamental
Rights: The British Scene, supra note 14, at 1579-83; Mann, supra note 11, at 517-24.
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porate the Convention into British law was introduced in the House of Lords,
and that House voted to urge the Government to introduce a similar bill in the
House of Commons.2" Because of the dissolution of Parliament, the 1978 bill
did not proceed further, but in July 1979 a new bill was introduced before the
House of Lords of the present Parliament. Neither the 1978 bill nor the 1979
bill would "entrench" the Convention against repeal by a simple majority of
Parliament, but each bill would give the Convention precedence over prior
statutes and would direct the courts to construe future Acts of Parliament in
accordance with the Convention unless such a construction were impossible.
Additionally, many Bill of Rights advocates do not accept the argument
that the British constitution does not permit a restriction of Parliament's
legislative sovereignty by an "entrenched" Bill of Rights. Indeed, this argu-
ment presents a logical and historical inconsistency. If Parliament cannot
now restrict its legislative power and that of its successors, then how were
William and Mary able to diminish the power of the monarchy when they
accepted the constitutional settlement of 1688-1689? The answer may well be
that in fact British constitutional precedents support the proposition that
ultimate sovereignty resides in the nation rather than in Parliament. Such an
interpretation would be consistent with the events of 1688-1689 and would
permit the British nation to adopt a new constitutional settlement which
would restrict parliamentary power. 2' Lord Hailsham, for example, believes
that Parliament and the Queen should summon a constitutional convention
(similar to the "Convention" of 1688) which would be empowered to draft a
written constitution, including a Bill of Rights, for approval by Parliament
and popular referendum. 2
In sum, the case for a British Bill of Rights appears to derive persuasive
support from historical English concepts of law and politics as well as the
American constitutional model. Moreover, in this age where social problems
have become increasingly complex and have called forth an ever-expanding
bureaucracy to solve them, the demands of society and the State threaten to
overwhelm the rights and dignity of the individual. In Britain, as in the
United States, the best guarantee of human rights is a constitutional commit-
ment which cannot be changed at the whim of a transitory legislative major-
ity.23 However, in Britain this guarantee does not exist, because the doctrine
of parliamentary sovereignty permits a bare majority in Parliament to inter-
fere with even those personal liberties which are recognized at common law.
Therefore, it seems clear that the time has come for the adoption of a British
Bill of Rights which would restrict the authority of Parliament and give con-
stitutional protection to fundamental individual liberties.
2
°Scarman, Fundamental Rights: The British Scene, supra note 14, at 1585 n.38.2 See, e.g., N. ANDERSON, supra ncte 2, at 37-38, 53-56.
"Hailsham, Elective Dictatorship, supra note 14, at 14-16.
"See Scarman, Fundamental Rights: the British Scene, supra note 14, at 1585-86; N. ANDER-
SON, supra note 2, at 51-58; Hailsham, Elective Dictatorship, supra note 14.
